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Residential investment played a key role in the long expansion of the Spanish economy for 
more than a decade to 2007 and in the crisis it has undergone in recent years. This variable is 
of great importance for analysis of the cycle, in booms and busts alike, for several reasons: its 
spillover effects on various productive branches; its impact on the prices of the main asset 
making up household wealth; and its infl uence on the shape of household and corporate fi nan-
cial fl ows, given the high level of leverage residential construction entails. 
This article aims to review the current situation of the housing investment adjustment in Spain, 
following the sharp turnaround seen in recent years in real estate activity and prices. To do this 
if fi rst examines the role residential investment has played in output since the start of the last 
expansion, from the standpoint of both supply and demand, and the main channels of trans-
mission through which it affects other productive branches and also agents’ spending deci-
sions. Next, a more detailed analysis follows of the trajectory of the housing investment adjust-
ment since 2007, and recent developments in real estate prices are set out. Finally, a general 
assessment is made of the state of the adjustment and of the outlook for this investment com-
ponent. While this process has undoubted effects on fi nancing fl ows in the economy and on 
fi nancial stability, these matters will remain outside the scope of analysis of this article.
In the recent period, the role of the housing market in cyclical developments in the Spanish 
economy has clearly been signifi cant. Real investment in housing increased sharply in the ex-
pansion, more than doubling between 1998 and 2007, and it has since fallen abruptly, ac-
counting in 2010 Q3 for scarcely half its level in 2007. As analysed in various papers, housing 
investment habitually shows a very marked cyclical profi le, intensely affecting changes in GDP, 
of which it is occasionally a leading indicator [see Leamer (2007) for the case of the United 
States, and Álvarez and Cabrero (2010) for Spain]. However, it is no easy task to quantify the 
infl uence that residential investment may have exerted on the course of economic activity, ow-
ing to its multiple interactions with other areas of the economy and to the fact that its trajec-
tory induces signifi cant effects on other variables.
A starting point to measure such effects is to record the direct impact on activity that arises 
from changes in residential investment, through calculating its contributions to GDP growth. 
Under this approach, housing investment – which is a component of demand – contributed 
around 0.5 pp on average to annual GDP growth in the 1998-2007 period, which accounts for 
around 15% of the total increase in output in this expansionary phase. In the subsequent ad-
justment stage, the contraction in investment was faster and its negative contribution to GDP 
growth most signifi cant, since it subtracted 1 pp in 2008, 2 pp in 2009 and, probably, around 
1 pp in 2010. As a result, this decline represents a similar amount to the overall cumulative 
decline in GDP in this period (see Chart 1). If, in cumulative terms, the increase in housing in-
vestment contributed 5 pp to GDP growth in the decade from 1998 to 2007, this cumulative 
contribution fell to 1 pp over the period from 1998 to 2010.
An alternative for proxying the effects of changes in residential construction on activity would 
be to attempt to evaluate its direct impact on GDP from the supply standpoint, under the Na-
tional Accounts framework. But the information available in this connection is limited. First, the 
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supply-side data refer to the value added of construction as a whole, without distinguishing 
between housing and other construction. Further, even if this distinction were made, it should 
be borne in mind that the concept of value added excludes inputs, which may be recorded 
under other branches (e.g. in industry, inasmuch as industrial inputs, such as cement and 
other materials, have been used in construction), whereby the measurement of the contribu-
tion of housing to output on the supply side would be biased downwards.
The input-output tables are a potential tool for proxying these spillover effects of residential in-
vestment on other productive branches.1 On the basis of the 2005 National Accounts input-
output tables, a simple exercise has been performed simulating the effects that would arise from 
the observed trajectory of housing investment in the 1998-2010 period. The results obtained 
suggest that the cumulative increase in residential investment from 1998 to 2007 would have 
contributed around 8 pp to total output growth2 (including inputs), with a contribution from the 
construction sector of more than 5 pp, while the spillover effect on other branches, as a result of 
the supply of inputs for the real estate sector, would involve a contribution of 1.5 pp from indus-
try and of 1 pp from services (see Chart 2). A similar analysis may be applied to employment. This 
has it that the increase in the production of housing allowed for economy-wide growth in em-
ployment of around 1.3 million people, accounting for 25% of the rise in employment in this pe-
riod. Of this latter fi gure approximately 900,000 would have been concentrated in construction 
jobs, and the rest (400,000) distributed in equal proportions between industry and services.
Apart from these more accounting-based approximations, an evaluation can also be made of 
the macroeconomic implications of the adjustment process observed in housing investment. 
Here, an econometric model that takes into account the various transmission channels is of use. 
In particular, in the Spanish case, the effect of the decline in investment on employment in this 
1. Despite the large-scale simplifi cations of an input-output model-based approach, which derive from the underlying 
assumptions made (the stability of the technical coeffi cients, the linearity of the relationships, the absence of changes 
induced by variations in relative prices, etc.), the symmetrical input-output tables contain worthwhile elements for the 
quantifi cation and hierarchisation of specifi c disaggregated impacts in the area of the branches of activity. 2. An output 
concept such as that which GDP represents cannot be derived from the input-output tables; rather, a broader concept 
of total output is derived, in which the inputs that all branches draw from other branches feature. Accordingly, these es-
timates cannot be compared with those made in terms of GDP.
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sector and its induced impact on employment in other branches have had very negative conse-
quences for household demand and for income expectations, which have tended to heighten 
the scale of the adjustment in spending and in activity. These second-round effects have proven 
particularly signifi cant in Spain, given the relatively high level that housing investment as a pro-
portion of GDP and employment in this productive branch had come to account for. Moreover, 
a signifi cant factor in the analysis of the infl uence of the residential market on the business cycle 
is the trajectory of house prices and their impact on private consumption, via the so-called 
“wealth effects”. These effects are substantial in Spain’s case, though less signifi cant than in the 
Anglo-Saxon countries, such as the United States and the United Kingdom. There, households 
habitually take advantage of rises in house prices, using the greater value of their collateral to 
extend their mortgage loans and fi nance thereby greater consumption, a practice that is rela-
tively infrequent in Spain. If, so as to take into account these and other complementary channels, 
the impact of the adjustment is simulated through the Banco de España Quarterly Macroeco-
nomic Model (MTBE), it is estimated that the fall in housing investment would account for a 
sharper cumulative decline in GDP than that estimated using the purely accounting approach 
presented earlier on the demand side [see Banco de España (2010)]. This estimate does not 
incorporate the foreseeable effects linked to the sectoral reallocation of the productive resources 
in construction that will probably take place mostly over the same period.
As discussed in the previous section, the housing investment adjustment has proven particu-
larly sharp in recent years. Compared with its peak, the cumulative decline in residential invest-
ment amounted to 45% in 2010 Q3, against 13% at the bottom of the crisis in the early 1990s 
(see Chart 3). This difference is essentially due to the fact that in the expansionary cycle in the 
second half of the 1980s, supply did not respond on the same scale as in the recent boom 
[see Artola and Montesinos (2006)]: the peak for housing starts in that cycle was 300,000 
(observed in 1989), compared with 750,000 starts in 2007, which has meant that the collapse 
in the construction of new houses has had a much more signifi cant effect on the current cycle. 
The outcome of this strong expansion was that housing investment came to account in Spain 
for a high percentage of GDP. This fi gure stood at 9.5% of GDP in nominal terms in 2007, 
higher than that of other economies undergoing an intense real estate boom, such as the 
United States and the United Kingdom, but less marked than that in others such as Ireland 
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(see Chart 4).3 Further to the subsequent adjustment, the weight of housing investment in 
GDP in Spain was close to 4% in 2010, thus below the level recorded in the previous cycle, 
and also below what this investment component accounts for in the euro area.
To characterise the current phase of the real estate market adjustment and to plot its potential 
course, various indicators must be consulted. But, previously, a clarifi cation is perhaps needed 
to analyse this adjustment: in National Accounts, housing investment refl ects more a supply-
side than a demand-side concept, since all built houses, irrespective of whether they are fi -
nally sold, are included in residential investment as featured in these accounts.4 Hence, Na-
tional Accounts refl ect under residential investment an estimate of the houses that have been 
completed in each quarter. One simple means of approximating this item is to observe the 
difference between the number of housing starts and completed houses: when more houses 
are started than are completed, the number of houses under construction increases and, with 
it, the scale of residential investment (and vice versa).5 As Chart 4 shows, in recent quarters 
the difference between the number of housing starts and completions is gradually becoming 
less signifi cant; accordingly, if the pace of housing starts were to hold at its current level, the 
rate of construction of new houses and, along with this, that of residential investment might 
stabilise over the course of 2011.
Consideration must also be given in the analysis of housing investment to the fact that real 
estate supply has singular features, with fairly prolonged maturity periods, given the need for 
prior land development, the requirements of medium-term urban planning and, fi nally, once 
the projects have been approved, a long lead-time, which on average stands at between 18 
months and two years. These characteristics mean that the supply of housing can only re-
spond with some lag to changes in demand. Thus, sharp changes in the demand for housing 
will only gradually affect investment as refl ected in National Accounts, since the latter will only 
show how these changes in demand will infl uence new housing starts6 and, in short, construc-
tion dynamics in the following quarters.
In the recent adjustment phase, the consequences of the natural lag in the supply response to 
changes in demand have been clearly apparent. Although housing starts began to fall back in 
the face of the fi rst signs in early 2007 of some slowdown in the demand for housing, numerous 
projects started two years earlier were completed in this period. And adding to these, especially 
in 2008, were those begun when the market was still looking very buoyant (see Chart 5). This 
mismatch between the lower demand for new housing and the still-high completion of projects 
undertaken during the boom period led, therefore, to a sharp build-up in unsold new housing.
Estimating the trajectory and the number of new unsold houses is not straightforward; among 
other reasons, because the information on housing supply and demand in Spain is drawn from 
different statistical sources, based on different methodologies, which means that any compari-
son should be viewed with great caution. The estimate set out here is based on an indirect 
approach, which uses the available statistics on administrative records relating to housing sup-
ply and demand. In the case of supply, the number of completed houses is approximated using 
building completion certifi cates, published by the Spanish Ministry of Development, while on 
3. See Marqués et al. (2010) and, for a broad overview of housing markets and of their macroeconomic implications in 
the main European countries, De Bandt et al. (2010). 4.  Completed but unsold houses do not therefore feature under 
inventories in these accounts, but under residential investment itself. 5. The National Accounts estimates are more 
complex, since the rate at which investment is committed may differ in the different phases of the construction process. 
Moreover, included under housing investment is renovation work, which is not analysed here but which may account for 
around 20% of residential investment. 6. But, for instance, it cannot be ruled out that a sharp reduction in demand may 
lead certain projects already under way to grind to a halt, especially if they are at an incipient stage.
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the demand side, the number of new-house transactions is estimated through notarial records 
on property transfers. Even during the boom years, these two statistics show different levels 
(with a greater level of supply than of demand), whereby the present estimates of the stock of 
unsold housing have been made by accumulating, since end-2003, the differences between 
the volume of fi nished housing and the number of new-house transactions, meaning that it is 
assumed that this stock was relatively insubstantial in 2003, which appears to be reasonable.
A further factor for consideration in this estimate is that a portion of the housing is constructed 
under a “build-it-yourself” regime, in which case the execution of the sale/purchase by means 
of public deed is not obligatory. This means that there is a certain number of housing units, 
ranging between 70,000 and 80,000 per year, which might feature in the statistic covering 
building completion certifi cates, but not in sale and purchase fi gures, which are drawn from 
notarial records. Although there is information on these “build-it-yourself” houses, it cannot be 
known to what extent owners public-deed the transaction or not. Accordingly, in the estimate 
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presented here, what are shown are bands depicting the possible scale of the stock of unsold 
housing, depending on whether it is considered that all houses constructed under the “build-
it-yourself” regime were public-deeded (in which case the total number of houses built under 
this regime would have to be added to property transfers).
Under these assumptions, it is estimated that the stock of unsold housing expanded sharply 
in recent years, especially until late 2009. This is because although building completion certifi -
cates moved on a declining trend from 2008, so too did the demand for housing and with a 
lower level. In contrast, it is estimated that the stock of unsold housing has tended to stabilise 
in 2010, with some oscillations in the demand for new houses, especially in Q2 and Q3, which 
might be linked to the bringing forward of purchases to Q2 owing to the VAT rise in July this 
year. It was estimated this stock was standing at between 700,000 and 1.1 million housing 
units in 2010 Q3, accounting for between 2.8% and 4.6% of the estimated stock of housing 
in Spain (see Chart 6).7 Over the coming months a strong decline in completed housing is 
expected (corresponding to fewer housing starts in 2008 and 2009, following the outbreak of 
the crisis). As a result, if demand were to stabilise (it may even increase in the closing months 
of 2010 owing to the elimination of the personal income tax house purchase relief for incomes 
above a certain threshold, with effect from 1 January 2011), the stock of unsold housing would 
gradually be absorbed.
It is not possible to estimate with accuracy what are principal or second dwellings in this stock 
of unsold housing, just as it cannot be known exactly what the breakdown between these two 
types is.8 In any event, the regional and provincial data offer some idea of the relative signifi -
cance of second homes, insofar as these are more abundant in the coastal provinces.
In fact, an estimate of the regional stock of unsold housing can be made on the basis of infor-
mation providing such a breakdown. In this instance, the stocks of unsold housing above the 
7. The former Ministry of Housing released in May 2010 an estimate of the stock of unsold housing in 2009 which is 
similar to the lower point of the range estimated in accordance with this methodology. 8. The latest direct estimate of 
their numbers is taken from the 2001 housing census, which showed that there were 3.4 million second dwellings (ac-
counting for 16% of the total) and 3 million empty houses (15% of the total). The bulk of the housing subject to the 
census consisted of principal dwellings (14 million, 68% of the total stock of housing, which amounted to almost 21 mil-
lion units that year).
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national average, in terms of the existing stock of housing, can be seen to be concentrated in 
certain regions in which, presumably, the weight of second homes is high. This is consistent 
with the signs that the real estate boom substantially expanded this housing segment and also 
with the fact that the demand for second homes has possibly fallen back more signifi cantly in 
the crisis (see Chart 7).
The presence of this sizeable stock of unsold housing is obviously a constraint on the speed 
of recovery of residential investment, insofar as a portion of the new demand will not have to 
be met through the construction of new property, but rather through the sale of housing that 
has already been built. Yet it should not be forgotten that there is no one, single housing mar-
ket in Spain; rather, there are many local markets. Hence, situations of excess supply in some 
markets (whether provincial markets or, for example, coastal housing markets) may coincide 
with other situations involving unmet demand. This means it is not necessary for the stock of 
unsold housing to disappear completely in order for residential investment to grow again. By 
way of illustration, Chart 7 shows that in Spain there are regions accounting for around 40% 
of the country’s total population that have a stock of unsold housing below 2% of the total 
stock of housing, which might be considered to be a level not far off the frictional mismatch 
that would always exist in this market.9
The rate of absorption of the housing overhang will depend on the buoyancy of demand, which, in 
turn, is infl uenced by numerous factors. These include fi nancial conditions, the macroeconomic 
outlook and household income-growth and employment prospects, demographic movements and 
expectations regarding property price adjustment. In particular, affordability is a key factor that will 
affect residential demand in the future and which depends, as well as on some of the aforemen-
tioned factors, on the course of house prices, which are examined in detail in the following section.
During real estate booms, residential investment expands and, habitually, house prices rise 
strongly, given the short-term rigidity of supply in responding to these increases in demand, as 
Recent developments in 
house prices
9.  In this chart, the fi gures depicted correspond to the lower point of the estimated range of unsold housing, i.e. to the 
assumption that housing under the “build-it-yourself” regime have not been public-deeded.
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discussed in the previous section. For this same reason, in adjustment phases a stock of un-
sold housing tends to emerge, which exerts pressure on property prices. Further, in some 
countries such as Spain, prices show a degree of downward stickiness in these adjustment 
phases, insofar as certain owners prefer to defer the sale of their houses (or opt to rent them 
out instead) before accepting a drop in prices, which prompts asymmetrical behaviour of 
residential prices.
In Spain’s case, house prices began to slow in 2005, but a fall in their levels only began to be 
seen in 2008. On information from the Ministry of Development, based on appraisal values, the 
cumulative decline in prices in real terms was 16% from 2007 to 2010 Q3 (-12.8% in nominal 
terms). In recent quarters the rate of decline of prices has eased, with milder quarter-on-
quarter falls which, in part, could be due to the momentum of demand arising from the above-
mentioned tax changes and from the improvement in the affordability indicators as a result of 
lower interest rates.
This adjustment is similar when house prices are assessed using the data drawn from notarial 
transactions, as INE does in its house price index (IPV). In this case, the adjustment in real 
terms to Q3 was 17%, with a signifi cant difference in the adjustment of new (-10%) as op-
posed to second-hand (-22%) house prices. It should also be noted that the real cumulative 
adjustment of house prices from 2007 to 2010 is similar to that which took place in the fi rst 
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years following the recession in the early 1990s. In that cycle, the real-terms decline in prices 
continued for two years more (see Chart 8).
This average adjustment masks substantial differences in terms of the type of housing, its 
geographical or in-town location, etc. Second-hand house prices too have adjusted to a 
greater extent than new housing. Also, the price adjustment in the second-home market (such 
as the coastal regions) has been greater than that in the provincial-capital markets, where 
habitual dwellings are concentrated. Even within the same city, house prices in the outlying 
districts have been seen to have fallen more than in the centre.
In the provincial data, some divergences are discernible in the degree of adjustment of house 
prices from their maximum levels (see Chart 9). While some Mediterranean coastal provinces 
or provinces bordering the Madrid region have posted nominal-terms price declines of close 
to 20% from their peak, in other areas, in contrast, the cuts have been very small or even non-
existent, in contrast to the national average fall of 12.8%. Perhaps one of the factors that has 
infl uenced the differing behaviour of house prices across Spanish provinces relates to the 
downward pressure exerted by the stock of unsold housing that has built up in the most recent 
period (see Chart 10). It can also be seen that this stock is inversely related to housing starts 
in recent years.
This article has reviewed the adjustment of residential investment and of house prices in recent 
years. If this real estate adjustment is analysed in terms of its impact on residential investment, 
the demand for housing or employment in the sector, it could be said that the bulk of the ad-
justment process is already over. The decline in these variables has been most sharp and swift: 
residential investment has dipped from accounting for 9.5% of GDP in 2007 to 4.5% in 2010 
Q3, below the former low; housing starts in 2010 will probably be only one-sixth of starts 
scarcely three years earlier; the demand for housing represents only half of that observed in 
2007. Although there are no data on employment in the housing sector, the strong decline in 
employment in construction (one million fewer workers since 2007) is probably concentrated 
in this sector. In all these cases, the latest developments suggest that these variables are close 
to stabilising, if they have not done so already.
However, in its wake this adjustment has left a high level of unsold housing, which weighs 
on the recovery in residential investment. In this respect, housing starts – the basic com-
ponent of residential investment – might in the near future be on a rather limited scale, 
below the low reached in the recession in the early 1990s: in the 12 months to 2010 Q3, 
there have been only 137,000 housing starts, with a fairly stable profi le that is consistent 
with the existing overhang and with the sluggishness of economic activity. While this fi gure 
might increase in the coming quarters, it does not seem likely that it will rapidly become 
more dynamic.
In light of the experience of past cycles, of other countries and of changes in the affordabil-
ity indicators, which continue to suggest that house prices absorb an excessively high 
portion of household disposable income, the adjustment of house prices might continue. 
As earlier discussed, certain tax factors may have softened the adjustment of prices in 
2010. But into 2011, it seems likely that prices will continue easing, meaning that the fi nan-
cial effort needed to purchase a house will not increase as the tax relief for higher-earning 
taxpayers disappears. In this respect certain regulatory changes, such as the greater tax 
neutrality between decisions to rent or buy, should tend to moderate house prices. At the 
same time, the very diffi culties some owners encounter in selling their houses and the 
regulatory changes to provide greater legal security to rental contracts might encourage 
Outlook and conclusions
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more owners to rent out their houses, increasing the existing supply and providing ready 
access by more households to residential services through this means, which does not 
require debt.
Evidently, the future trajectory of the adjustment will hinge essentially on the ensuing demand 
for housing. The potential demand for housing depends on various factors. Some, such as 
demographics, will not exert as expansionary an effect as they did in the boom period in light 
of the forecasts recently released by INE. These estimate a stabilisation of the population in 
the coming decade, with a positive but small contribution of migratory fl ows. All told, the trend 
observed during the expansion towards smaller household size, which came to a halt in the 
crisis, might be renewed, which would boost demand. In this respect, the high proportion of 
Spanish youths who live in the family home compared with those in other countries10 sug-
gests that, if income prospects improve and house prices ease, pent-up demand might 
emerge. Nor can it be ruled out that in this adjustment period some level of demand may have 
held back awaiting a greater adjustment in prices, whereby a fall in prices might encourage 
new purchases.
All these factors indicate that we will witness a gradual absorption of the supply overhang that has 
built up. This will be slow, meaning that residential investment will not contribute to the expansion 
of economic activity in the near future, but it might progressively become more dynamic as prices 
adjust and economic prospects improve. It is also important to note that, set against these gen-
eral features of the process at the national level, regional and provincial differences might be seen, 
in that certain key variables of this process (e.g. the supply overhang) differ substantially in local 
housing markets, meaning that this situation of slow improvement might run alongside a degree 
of buoyancy in some areas and more persistent sluggishness in others.
20.12.2010.
10.  See Becker et al. (2010).
R² = 0,24
-18
-16
-14
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
0 2 4 6 8
REGIONAL DATA
 NATIONAL TOTAL
 TREND LINE
PRICE AND STOCK OF UNSOLD HOUSING. 
REGIONAL BREAKDOWN
%
 c
ha
ng
e 
in
 p
ric
es
 fr
om
 p
ea
k 
to
 2
01
0 
Q
3
Estimate of stock of unsold housing as a % of 
the housing stock
SOURCES: Ministerio de Fomento and Banco de España.
R² = 0,34
-95
-90
-85
-80
-75
-70
-65
-60
-55
0 2 4 6 8
REGIONAL DATA
 NATIONAL TOTAL
 TREND LINE
Estimate of stock of unsold housing as a % of 
the housing stock
NUMBER OF HOUSING STARTS AND STOCK OF 
UNSOLD HOUSING. REGIONAL BREAKDOWN.
%
 c
ha
ng
e 
in
 n
um
be
r o
f o
pe
n-
m
ar
ke
t 
ho
us
in
g 
st
ar
ts
 b
et
w
ee
n 
20
06
 a
nd
 2
00
9
CHART 10STOCK OF UNSOLD HOUSING, PRICES AND ACTIVITY
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 14 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, DECEMBER 2010 THE RESIDENTIAL INVESTMENT ADJUSTMENT IN SPAIN: THE CURRENT SITUATION
ÁLVAREZ, L. J., and A. CABRERO (2010). “The cyclical behaviour of residential investment: some stylised facts”, Eco-
nomic Bulletin, July, Banco de España.
ARTOLA, C., and A. MONTESINOS (2006). “Características de la reciente expansión inmobiliaria en una perspectiva de 
medio plazo”, Boletín Económico, julio-agosto, Banco de España.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA (2010). Annual Report, 2009, Box 5.1, pp. 124-125.
BECKER, S. O., S. BENTOLILA, A. FERNANDES and A. ICHINO (2010). “Youth emancipation and perceived job security 
of parents and children”, Journal of Population Economics, vol. 23.
DE BANDT, O., T. KNETSCH, J. PEÑALOSA and F. ZOLLINO (eds.) (2010). Housing Markets in Europe, Springer Verlag.
LEAMER, E. E. (2007). “Housing is the business cycle”, Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pp. 149-
233.
MARQUÉS, J. M., L. Á. MAZA and M. RUBIO (2010). “A comparison of recent real estate cycles in Spain, the United 
States and United Kingdom”, Economic Bulletin, January, Banco de España. 
REFERENCES
